The inner citadel: what Epictetus considered the only thing truly in our control. 5 mins read.
Etymology and Origin: The Greek noun prohairesis derives from the verb prohaireomai (προαιρέομαι), meaning "to choose before" or "to prefer." Aristotle used the term to mean deliberate choice, but Epictetus transformed it into the cornerstone of his ethical system. In the Discourses, he repeatedly identifies prohairesis as the essence of the self—the one thing that cannot be enslaved, coerced, or damaged by external events.
Core Characteristics:
- Autonomy: Prohairesis is self-determining. No external force can compel you to assent to a false impression or to choose an action you judge to be wrong. This is the basis of Stoic freedom.
- Moral Valence: Only prohairesis is genuinely good or bad. External things like health, wealth, and reputation are indifferent—they can be used well or badly, but they have no moral value in themselves.
- Inviolability: Even in the face of death, prohairesis remains free. Epictetus says: "You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can overcome my prohairesis."
The concept of prohairesis is often compared to the modern notion of the will, but there is a crucial difference. The modern will is often conceived as a faculty for choosing between options, while prohairesis is more fundamental: it is the faculty that judges which options are worth choosing in the first place. It is not just the engine of action; it is the source of the values that guide action.
Relation to the Dichotomy of Control: Prohairesis is the only thing that falls into the category of "what is up to us." Everything else—the body, reputation, wealth, even life itself—is external. The dichotomy of control is essentially a map of the territory of prohairesis: it shows what belongs to this inner citadel and what lies outside its walls.
Criticisms: Some critics argue that Epictetus overstates the autonomy of prohairesis. Modern psychology suggests that our judgments and choices are heavily influenced by unconscious biases, social conditioning, and biological factors. Others contend that the concept is too individualistic—that it ignores the ways in which our moral character is shaped by our relationships and communities. Defenders of Epictetus respond that he is not denying these influences; he is insisting that, even within these constraints, we retain the capacity to reflect on and sometimes override our conditioned responses.
Influence: The concept of prohairesis has had a lasting influence on Western thought, particularly on the development of the idea of the will in Christian theology (through figures like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas) and in existentialist philosophy (through Sartre's concept of radical freedom). It remains a powerful reminder that, no matter what happens to us, we retain the capacity to choose our response.
Referenced Works & Texts
- Epictetus, Discourses, Book I, Chapters 1, 17, 29; Book II, Chapter 10 (c. 108 AD). The primary source for the concept.
- A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (2002). Chapters 3–4 on prohairesis.
- John M. Cooper, Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy (2012). Chapter on Stoicism and the role of prohairesis.
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