An Imaginative Hypothesis: The Play of Belief. Exploring Kendall Walton's influential resolution to the puzzle of fictional emotions. 7 mins read.
At the forefront of solutions to the Paradox of Fiction stands Kendall Walton's influential Make-Believe Theory. This theory, articulated primarily in his 1990 work Mimesis as Make-Believe, offers a sophisticated framework for understanding our emotional engagement with fictional narratives without attributing irrationality to the audience. Walton argues that when we interact with fiction, we are essentially participating in a sophisticated form of imaginative play, a 'game of make-believe.'
Central to this concept is the idea of 'props' and 'fictional truths.' The book, the film, or the play serves as a prop, generating fictional truths within the context of the game. For instance, a novel makes it fictionally true that Anna Karenina exists. Our emotional responses within this game are not 'genuine' emotions in the traditional sense, but rather 'quasi-emotions' or 'make-believe emotions.' If we cry while reading about Anna Karenina's death, we are not genuinely sad *for* Anna (since we know she isn't real), but it is *make-believedly* true that we are sad for her. Our physiological reactions—tears, a pounding heart—are real, but their emotional interpretation is governed by the fictional context.
This theory implicitly acknowledges the deep human capacity for imaginative projection, a faculty often dismissed as mere childishness but which, in fact, underpins much of our cognitive and social development. One might consider how contemporary virtual reality and advanced simulation technologies increasingly demand this very mode of 'make-believe' engagement, blurring the lines between what is merely imagined and what is perceptually presented as real.
The Make-Believe Theory skillfully navigates the paradox by denying that the emotions felt towards fiction are genuine emotions directed at real objects. Instead, it reinterprets these feelings as part of a larger, imaginative, and often culturally sanctioned, activity. Critiques often focus on whether 'quasi-emotions' adequately capture the intensity and authenticity of our experiences, or if the line between make-believe and genuine belief is truly as distinct as Walton proposes. Nevertheless, it remains a cornerstone in discussions about the aesthetics of fiction and the philosophy of mind.
Key Tenets of Make-Believe Theory
| Concept | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Props | Fictional works (books, films) that generate fictional truths. |
| Fictional Truths | Propositions that are true within the game of make-believe. |
| Quasi-Emotions | Make-believe emotions, distinct from genuine emotions, experienced within the fictional game. |
Referenced Works & Texts
- Walton, Kendall L., Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts (1990). The definitive text for the Make-Believe Theory.
- Currie, Gregory, "The Paradox of Caring: For and Against 'Make-Believe'," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 2 (1995). A critical examination of Walton's theory.
- Davies, Stephen, Philosophy of Art, Chapter 6: "Appreciating Art" (2006). Provides a comprehensive overview of various theories of aesthetic response, including make-believe.
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